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Abstract: This study advances an ethnographic exploration into a community 
of migrant workers from Turkey. The paper revolves around a fairly 
straightforward question asking why these people migrate, but the answer 
turns out to be complicated: Research findings point to the importance of 
economic dynamics. However, it is not possible to neglect non-economic 
motivations either. In particular, social/cultural capital and identity formations 
require a greater recognition. A fuller understanding of migration also 
necessitates going beyond rationality: economic and non-economic 
motivations are ubiquitously interwoven with irrational interactions between 
individuals and structures in both coercive and preferential ways. 
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Introduction 
Mitchell (1959) made an influential distinction between the ‘incidence’ and 
‘rate’ of migration. The former refers to the set of unique circumstances which 
induces a particular migrant to leave whereas the latter underlines the factors 
which determine the volume, trends and patterns. This was a tribute to 
Durkheim’s emphasis on the importance of statistical (rate) explanations for 
suicide (Durkheim, 1951). Equilibrium theory as the main framework of neo-
classical economics also maintained that migration reduced populations in 
low-growth areas increasing the supplying of labour in growing zones (Portes 
and Walton, 1972). The poor economies of third world countries were named 
as the main push factor for international migration. It was indeed empirically 
evidenced that people migrate from poorer areas/nations to richer ones in 
order to acquire higher living standards (Blackburn and Mann, 1979; Castles 
and Miller, 1993). 
More recently, economic growth in ‘emerging market economies’ has also 
been brought up as a major push factor. It was claimed that as mechanisation 
and restructuring in agriculture accelerated migration to cities, urban jobs 
failed to absorb rural immigrants adequately amid the exposure of automation 
processes and managerial practices to international competition (Harris, 1995; 
Luttwak, 1998). Meanwhile, the currencies of developed countries have 
become even stronger pull factors (Mann, 2005). In particular, liberalisation 
policies have made western labour markets more receptive to ‘the reserve 
army of migrant workers’ (Harris, 1995; Luttwak, 1998). Concerns over the 
disadvantaged work status of migrant workers were essentially rebuffed by 
policy makers citing remittances as a new source of international development 
(Datta et al. 2007): international transaction figures indicate that migrant 
workers send home substantial amounts of remittances –$350bn in 2010 
(IMF, 2011). However, the supremacy of economic accounts has faced both 
theoretical and empirical challenges in terms of explaining migration. 
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Non-Economic Motivations 
The idea of homo economicus in general was abandoned in favour of more 
conciliatory frameworks with cultural understandings (Bradley and Fenton, 
1999). An increasing number of migration scholars have also begun to take a 
guarded approach to economic reductionism (Bach, 2007; Barak, 2007; 
Cohen, 1988; Gray and Johnson, 2008; Massey and Espinoza, 1997; 
McGovern, 2007). Cohen (1988) argued, for example, that equilibrium theory 
was flawed by market imperfection in so far as a fatal anarchy was avoided. 
Approaches informed by context, structure and individual subjectivities appear 
to promise a better ‘fit’, especially with complex and diverse realties (Brannen 
and Nilsen, 2005). For instance, millions of people have fled homes for 
political conflicts and wars in recent decades (IOM, 2010). Ethical implications 
of heralding these people  as economic migrants were highly detrimental 
(Hayter, 2004). In the UK, the government issued a memorandum in 2007 
warning civil servants about stigmatisation, but refugees remain under 
studied. 
It is also becoming clearer that migrant workers are no longer necessarily 
better off than their counterparts at home. Through foreign trade and 
investment, for example, emerging market economies keep creating urban 
jobs with viable pay rates relative to living cost (Gray and Johnson, 2008). 
Increasing inequalities in developed economies, on the other hand, have left 
precarious migrant workers with extremely low wages; and many of them 
have become stranded in dept-traps to Gangmasters (Anderson, 2010; 
Davidson, 2008).  
Further, migrant workers are becoming more heterogeneous due to increases 
in the proportions of those who are coming from relatively better off sections 
of home countries (McGovern, 2007). Helped by the introduction of point 
system in Britain, for example, one in four new arrivals was recorded as a 
degree holder in 2010 (LFS, 2010). Migration of the well-educated has been 
conventionally studied within ‘brain-drain’ debates (Devitt, 2010), but many of 
them are nowadays reported to be overqualified for the jobs they fill. One in 
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ten migrant workers in elementary jobs, for example, was a degree holder in 
2010 (LFS, 2010). 
Variations among migrant workers raised academic interests into ‘circulatory’ 
(Oteanu, 2007) and ‘temporary’ migration (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007), 
although the return of immigrants had been long ignored. Reasons for return 
can be economic: after the start of recession, for example, the ratio of the 
outflows of foreign nationals from the EU 15 (as well as the UK) was recorded 
as high as fifty percent in 2009. However, it had not been too low before the 
recession either: forty-five percent in 2006 (OECD, 2010). That is, migrant 
workers may return for non-economic reasons as well (Razum et al., 2005). 
Some returnees may have migrated temporarily in the first place for, for 
example, social/cultural capital such as learning English and gaining work 
experience to take back home (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). They may also 
aim to meet people from different cultures, to have adventures or to fulfil their 
identities within new social settings (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009; Deener, 
2010). All these suggest that the depiction of non-economic motivations as 
‘incidence’ (Mitchell 1959) needs empirical and theoretical re-evaluations . 
Reasoning the Irrational 
Scholars focused on economic and non-economic motivations of migration 
usually assumed the existence of a rational decision making process in which 
people weigh options and possibilities in an environment of free choice 
(bearing in mind that a freely-reached decision can only operate within the 
constraints of the opportunities on offer). However, a rationally constructed 
‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 1959) may fail to capture social complexities 
fully as irrationality displays a ubiquitous presence. 
Irrationality is embedded within the economic and political foundations of 
contemporary societies. For example , an important aspect of Marx's (1971) 
critical description of capitalism was its irrationality. Capitalist irrational in his 
view included the creation of surplus by labour at its own expense (alienation); 
and sacrificing social benefits to individual profits for competition (anarchy). In 
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political terms, however, bureaucracy serves for the rationalization of irrational 
(Weber, 1947) as a way of securing the accomplishment of ‘collectivised’ 
goals (Nassehi, 2005). Post-modernist interlockers also emphasised 
methodological difficulties with a binary polarisation between rational and 
irrational as shown, for example, by Jackson and Scott (1997) in the case of 
sexuality: consciously constructed life styles are perceived as rational 
whereas special and spontaneous ones are perceived as irrational, but they 
often come together. 
In our daily lives, irrational may imply ‘absurdities’ associated with, for 
example, cultural symbols such as bikes and leather jackets with old style 
rock ‘n’ roll music as a manifestation of political deliberations (Willis, 2010). 
Irrational can also be a form of social anomy or pathology as pejoratively 
defined by Merton (1938), but it does not have to be like that always, and it 
may well be the way around. Crime, for example, may have its own rationale 
both economically (Luttwak, 1999) and socially as a way of safety and 
respectability (Garot, 2009), although this does not make crime more 
preferable. Likewise, irrational may refer to something that we casually label 
as ‘stupid’, but it does not have to be like that, and if anything it may be again 
the way around. For instance, as Bone (2006) pointed out, direct selling 
organisations irrationally sell their products without profit, but this is 
‘rationalised’ by competitive purposes. 
Irrational is by no means less relevant to migration. Xenophobic or racist 
attitudes, to start with, are frequently based on irrational fears since they 
reflect prejudices (Billig, 1978). Irrational behaviours are also observed at 
policy levels: in 2010, for example, a cap on non-EU migrants was introduced, 
despite the fact that it was dismissed as irrational by many commentators 
including Vince Cable the business secretary (Rigby et al., 2010). Lack of 
flexibility in work permits is still prevalent, although it had long been criticised 
as irrational (Grant, 2007). Similarly, not legalising semi-compliant (Ruhs and 
Anderson, 2006) or illegal migrants were widely lamented as irrational, not 
least by the deputy prime minister Nick Clegg, due to tax losses (Dinwoodie, 
2010). 
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Bearing all these issues in mind, I will explore the role of economic, non-
economic and irrational factors in the migration decisions of a community of 
Kurdish and Turkish migrant workers. Despite being the largest group of 
immigrants across Europe, migrant workers from Turkey remain under 
researched, especially in the UK. Turkey’s candidacy to EU as a Muslim 
country makes a better comprehension of these people’s experiences even 
more important. 
Exploring a community of migrant workers 
Broader frame of this research is informed by life experiences since I joined 
the community in Cardiff following in the footsteps of ‘organic public 
sociologists’ (Burawoy, 2005). I became a community member and setter 
when it began to emerge in the early years of the millennium. My 
engagements started with assisting people as an interpreter, and then I added 
advocacy for official dealings, bureaucratic hurdles and legal matters. Later, I 
also gained confidence to advice on career and business prospects. Through 
a ‘temporal continuum’ (Katz, 2010), such experiences nurtured an 
empathetic insight into the community. 
However, sometimes I could not understand apparently the simplest things: 
why a Turkish worker, for example, would drive thirty km, from Pentre to 
Cardiff, to buy lemon juice ‘made in Turkey’ or some other equally (as I 
perceived then) trivial things which were probably ‘better valued’ in the local 
Sainsbury’s anyway. Or how come a woman could not speak a word of 
English after living some twenty odd years in the UK. To satisfy my curiosity, I 
embarked on an ‘engaged listening’ (Forsey, 2010) in the shape of target-
oriented observations as well as conversations. Overtime, my ethnographic 
undertakings turned to systematic inquiries. Specific commentaries provided 
in this paper about migration motivations are largely based on such 
exploratory investigations. 
Wider setting of my inquiries has a multi-sited character, but differently from 
the leading bi-spatial study of Bourdieu (2000), it dwells on a variety of 
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locations within the same and different cities as well as countries covering 
workplaces, domestic spheres and community organisations from mosques to 
night clubs. In doing so, this study particularly contributes to the efforts to 
bridge workplace and community divide (Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010). My 
work also differs from most of the later examples of multi-spatial interventions 
(Wacquant, 2004) in that I studied with not only the same but also different 
individuals in various settings. The reason for such an accentuated ‘multi-
sited’ approach is because community members are closely connected with 
relatives and friends in other cities including London, Birmingham and 
Manchester. They also have transnational links to Germany, Greece, Iraqi 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in addition to Turkey. 
The most commonly used language is Turkish but some Kurds refuse to 
speak Turkish considering it to be an ‘albatross of colonial assimilation’. 
Instead, they prefer English or German as well as Kurdish. Nor are they 
impressed with being called ‘Turkish (-speaking) Communities’. The war of 
Kurds for independence from Turkey feeds into some geographical and 
political divisions in London: Kurds mostly live in Hackney and Haringey 
whereas Turks have a higher density in Stoke Newington and surrounding 
boroughs. Bitter relations amount to stereotypes: Some Turks call Kurds 
‘terrorist’ (militants of PKK, Kurdish Workers’ Party) and some Kurds call 
Turks ‘fascist’. They also mutually incriminate each other as ‘sebeke’ –
member of drug networks in Turkey accounting for seventy percent of heroin 
smuggled into Britain (Independent, 2011). 
However, the community in Cardiff as the core source of findings reported in 
this paper mainly lacks such divisions. Although it is a relatively small one, the 
community is scattered across the city. This is not a neighbourhood 
community. As opposed to London-based communities with similar 
backgrounds, only a few community members in Cardiff work in the kebab 
sector. They work in a variety of jobs from waitressing in Café Rouge to 
running international property agencies. Yet symbiosis is unmistakable  as 
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firmly stated by a fishmonger1: ‘we are only few in Wales and we need to be 
social. Therefore we often see each other. We eat kebab or Chinese together 
or seek help from each other to find a job or to barrow’. 
Economic Motivations 
Historically, international migration from Turkey has two distinct stages: The 
first one came in the 1960s and 1970s when hundreds of thousands of people 
migrated, especially to Germany as ‘guest workers’. A high level of poverty 
and the rarity of opportunities to improve living standards in Turkey had been 
blamed for the migration (White, 1997). Since the mid-1980s, on the other 
hand, Turkey has had one of the fastest growing economies in the World. The 
growth paradoxically gave a further momentum to migration because of the 
exclusion of people from economic life, especially for agricultural 
mechanisation, industrial automation and managerial rationalisation (Cam, 
2007). This second wave widened the presence of migrant workers from 
Turkey across Europe and Britain (including Wales more recently) . 
Many members of the community in Cardiff emphasised that they left home 
for economic reasons. A Kurdish plumber said that his family had to move 
from their village giving up husbandry because of cheaper meat imports. 
When they went to Diyarbakir, they realised that ‘there was no way to support 
the family’, and ‘things did not get any better after moving to Istanbul’. Once 
the opportunity emerged to come to Europe, they decided ‘to have a go in 
England’. His wife  said that ‘I would not leave home if it were not for sending 
money to my father-in-law’. Economic motivations were evident among 
Turkish participants as well: A bar tender typically noted that ‘more and more 
young people like me want to escape to other countries for jobs’.  
Economic factors in deciding to migrate are so pronounced that migration 
itself turns out to be a business investment in some cases. A taxi driver said 
that ‘you should pay traffickers around £10K’. A cleaner also pointed out that 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, personal information about participants is limited by the terms of anonymity 
and confidentiality for their consent 
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‘…or you should show a handsome balance in your account to convince 
Home Office that you will be able to support yourself without benefit’. 
Sometimes the money required can be obtained from relatives but ‘you have 
to pay it back with a ridiculous interest rate, especially if you barrow from 
small lenders’. Kemal who runs an upholstery workshop sarcastically uttered 
that ‘you have to be rich to come to rich countries’. 
Economic motivations are also evident among asylum seekers, and this 
consolidates ethnic tensions. A Turkish carer, for example, critically argued 
that ‘asylum seekers are mostly Kurdish people who lie to blacken our home-
land for the sake of living on the dole in England’. However, defensiveness is 
not ambiguous either: after some heated debates around a raki table, 
discussants established that ‘when the West imposed visa restrictions on 
economic migrants, especially unemployed Kurds were left with no choice 
other than applying for asylum… this is a shame on imperialist powers and 
comprador bourgeoisie, but not on the victims’. Criticism was deepened for 
the ban on employing asylum seekers: ‘because of this restriction, people are 
trapped in illegal exploitation with no rights for minimum wage or anything 
else.’ In response to my intervention to remind that Home Office provided 
accommodation and support in asylum centres, a refugee who could not go 
home for seven years snapped at me: ‘government talks about human rights, 
but it is silent about suicides in refugee concentration camps’. 
Members of the community send remittances for helping relatives back home, 
but participants usually reported that ‘larger parts of the money go for buying a 
home, a summer house or small investments’. To prevent such savings from 
leaving the country, the British government has encouraged visa applications 
in recent years as a businessperson under the provisions of the European 
Community Association Agreement with Turkey (known as ‘Ankara 
Agreement’ within the community). The policy also aims to attract small 
savings from Turkey whilst prioritising the relatives of immigrants. During our 
conversations, small savers deemed the UK ‘a good place for investment, 
especially for its strong currency’.  
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Although it is difficult to give a reliable number about those who came to 
Britain through the Ankara Agreement, it apparently helped the expansion of 
businesses from kebab takeaways to restaurants and franchised big brands 
such as McDonalds, KFC and Beef Eater, especially in London and 
Manchester. Further, a variety of businesses has emerged beyond the food 
industry, from jewellery shops and car dealers to running bars/pubs and 
cinemas. Such developments witnessed a considerable increase in economic 
migrants in recent years. In particular, as an instance of chain migration 
(Castles and Miller, 1993), employers mostly indicated that ‘we prefer fellow 
migrant workers from Turkey’. The spreading of companies has also made it 
more difficult to talk about an ‘ethnic economy’ as defined by a mono-cultural 
homogeneity among customers (Edward and Ram, 2006). Even so, economic 
spectrums do not seem to be enough to understand the diversity within the 
community in terms of migration motivations. 
Beyond Economic Motivations 
Non-economic migration motivations vary from the long-term care of an 
autistic child, for example, to seeking asylum. Asylum seekers are usually 
under estimated due to those who have economic motivations . However, daily 
clashes of protestors with the police in the eastern provinces of Turkey like 
Diyarbakir and Batman, as well as the on-going war between the army and 
PKK guerrillas in rural mountains are an arresting indicator of political unrest. 
Tensions are also exacerbated by the heavy-handed strategies of the 
government: A waiter at Hilton, for example, said that ‘to block logistic 
supports to guerrillas, the state forced us to evacuate our village. For the 
safety of my family, PKK brought us to England’. There are also cases in 
which people are not officially asylum seekers but they effectively take refuge 
in the UK. A decorator who was a columnist back in Turkey said that ‘I am 
waiting for the enactment of the freedom of thought bill as part of the 
Copenhagen Criterion’ (EU stipulations for accession). 
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Nor does everyone whose visa is based on ‘Ankara Agreement’ actually have 
economic motivations . To be sure, people in such positions sign up for the 
agreement to set up businesses and appear to have started businesses. They 
comply with legal niceties, from opening business accounts to renting shops 
and paying all taxes as well as using professional accountancy services. 
However, they do not necessarily operate businesses. A chartered accountant 
highlighted that ‘there is a legal complication because of fake trades. Home 
Office is aware of the issue, but it is difficult to press for the charges since 
paper-works are done properly’. In an attempt to crackdown on such 
schemes, the government made it compulsory in March 2011 to apply only 
from within Turkey, hoping that this would reduce the use of personal contacts 
to organise ‘imaginary businesses’. However, the plan largely remains on hold 
due to strong criticisms for obstructing investments from within the UK. 
It is sociologically meaningful to ask why these people are not actually running 
their shops. As a general pattern, ‘the important thing’, in the words of Rojda 
who is a freelance journalist, ‘is to stay in the UK as long as necessary’. Such 
businesses are regarded as ‘a way of buying visa’ rather than worthy 
enterprises per se. Another participant reaffirmed this in a striking way: ‘there 
is more to life than selling watermelons’. Such failures to conform to 
conventional economic theories are not peculiar to those who signed up for 
the Ankara Agreement to operate ‘imaginary businesses’. It is a more 
common phenomenon among the community members. 
Many people said that ‘I am here just temporarily… I am planning to go back 
sometime soon’. Some of the community members want to stay in the UK in 
order to gain ‘right to stay’ (indefinite leave to remain) or to become citizen. 
One should keep in mind that the desire to go back is occasionally set back by 
the scarcity of job opportunities in Turkey, especially for the better educated 
(Fearn, 2011). However, owing to language barriers, for example, those who 
had been educated in Turkey (other than in Britain) are less likely to get a job 
in the UK that would pay off on a par with alternative jobs in Turkey. Indeed, 
even those who have become British citizen tend go back to Turkey ‘soon 
after finding a good-enough job for a decent life’. 
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Well educated members of the community usually work in low pay jobs: ‘I am 
a survey engineer by training but I am doing the dishes in Pizza Hot’ said one 
of them. Another one complained that ‘I have master degree in journalism but 
I am working as a babysitter’. A computer engineer added that ‘I keep finding 
excuses to postpone my mother’s visit because she may have heart attack if 
she learns that I am working as a fetch-boy in a grocery shop’. These highly 
educated people are also involved in a wider range of works which do not 
require their skills at all, such as gardening, body-guarding and bus driving. 
Notion of the ‘relative value of penny’ (Mann, 2005) does not work for the 
better educated: First of all, those who signed up for the Ankara Agreement 
are allowed only to run their own businesses. Therefore, ‘the operators of 
imaginary businesses’ actually work illegally in temporary jobs. Many more 
members of the community are also semi-compliant (Ruhs and Anderson, 
2006) due to lack of work permit. As a result, their pay is often below the 
minimum wage. Nevertheless, another commonly suggested reason for this 
was the ‘westernised life style of educated people’. A participant said that ‘I 
fancy eating out, clubbing and trendy brands. Because I cannot afford any of 
these, my family supports me from Turkey. Such occasional incidents of 
financial support from home are obviously at odds with the economistic 
explanations of migration. 
Many of those who do not fit into a typology of economic migrant want to go to 
language schools or study for master, but only few of them can manage this: a 
typical response was ‘I feel frustrated by limited funding opportunities and 
expensive tuition fees… It would be cheaper if Turkey were in the EU’. 
Participants also critically commented on the removal of public funds for free 
English courses, ESOL in 2009; and the tightening of attendance controls in 
language schools by Home Office since 2010 in order to combat fake 
studentship visas. They argued that such policies ‘put people off the 
language’. However, some participants also see the community’s itself as a 
‘honey trap’: A gardener said that ‘it is fun to hang around with Turkish people 
but it slows  down my progress in English. Instead, they try to make British 
friends yet this is often denied by a ‘racist exclusion’. ‘Even if you have 
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friends’, a call-on nurse furthered, ‘English people [she meant the British] are 
cold. They never invite me to Xmas dinners’. English learners also become 
friends with other foreigners to practice, but in the words of a teacher, 
‘pragmatism limits the continuity of friendships’. 
Identity politics plays a central role in terms of non-economic motivations: 
community members, for example, speak very highly of ‘the opportunities 
provided by the British multi-culturalism for self-realisation’’ within ethnic, 
gender and religious realms. Such a perception is most prevalent among gay 
and lesbian groups. Lesbian communities, for example, have nation-wide and 
international networks. They occasionally gather in exclusive pubs and clubs 
in London and Manchester for Turkish, Kurdish, Iranian, Azeri and Greek 
lesbians, but a few white British also join them. A Kurdish lesbian said that ‘if I 
were in Istanbul, I would not feel safe even in the streets of Beyoglu, although 
it is the most relaxed district in Turkey. Everyday we hear the news of a 
women getting scar-faced or nitric acid thrown to’. 
Community members occasionally associate their identity with places (Benson 
and O’Reilly, 2009; Deener, 2010). Accessibility of international transport 
made it less of trouble for people who wish to travel to other countries without 
an economic rational. Taking the opportunity of inexpensive tickets, some 
participants want to acquire, for example, multi-spatial identities. A council 
worker said that ‘I don’t have to live in either Istanbul or London. I am not a 
millionaire, but I can live in both cities at the same time thanks to Easy Jet’. 
Further, several respondents argued that ‘staying in the UK even for a short 
while is what defines you when you go back home’. One of them added that 
‘people may not know your name but they will know that you are the one who 
came from England. You instantly become a local fame’. 
Crucially, original motivations for migration sometimes do not shed light on the 
big picture, especially when they are set aside over time in favour of new 
considerations. Abandoning economic goals after their attainment to certain 
degree, for example, is often the case among migrant workers who want to go 
back home due to, for example, lack of integration, racism or sentimental 
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reasons (Razum et al., 2005). Sehriban, mother of a two-year old toddler said 
that ‘I want to go back before the boy starts to school. I don’t want to throw my 
baby at the mercy of racist teachers or drug dealers’. Such concerns confirm 
previous research findings on challenges to children’s academic development 
(Enneli et al., 2005). 
Likewise, the reasons for coming to Britain may no longer be the same 
reasons for wishing to remain in the country. Younger men among ‘economic 
migrants’, for instance, frequently underlined that although they would like to 
go back to Turkey, they could not do so because of conscription. A Kurdish 
man said that ‘I might get drafted to the war against my people if I go back’. 
Some Turks also refuse national service on the basis of ‘conscientious 
responsibilities’. The following section will focus on various motivations for 
migrating to, or remaining in the UK that lack a straightforward rational. 
Ubiquitous Irrational and Motivations 
I came here believing that this country was a paradise…I was not the 
only one who thought so…Do I know what the heck for I am still here..? 
I came here ten years ago. The person who came here is not me any 
more… I am still trying to find a way to clear up her mess …’                 
    A dietician       
The findings of this research point to  a multi-faceted irrationality: sometimes 
my observations fell into a grey area between rational and irrational; 
sometimes the irrational emerged as a structural as well as an 
individual/personal occurrence. Sometimes it turned out to be either coercive 
or preferential as well as both. What follows will explore such ubiquitous 
characteristics of the irrational in the day-to-day life of the community for a 
fuller understanding of migration motivations . 
To distinguish the  irrational from the rational is not always easy. It does not 
make perfect sense, for example, if some pious Muslims say that they live in 
Britain for religious freedom, although they came from a Muslim country with 
an explicitly pro-Islamic party in office over the past decade. However, this 
can also be seen as a ‘plausible’ response to the state of affairs: after 
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complaining about the political influence of secular military and judiciary, an 
imam added that ‘I don’t want my daughter to get educated in Turkey… those 
powerful infidels don’t allow headscarves in schools’. 
Irrational may occur within the terrains of personal choices as revealed by 
some conversations on marriage. Despite clamorous policy rhetorics about 
‘the industry of con marriages’, marriage for money is quite unusual within the 
community. However, what a participant called the ‘marriage of convenience’ 
is more common. She stipulated that ‘it is a real marriage but romance is 
blended with a promise of UK passport for the spouse’. In particular, the most 
telling, if not incredible, tales are missed out amid the moral panic about ‘fake 
marriages’: the hope of finding the true love of life, for example, is sometimes 
the main drive for coming to Britain. In a gathering of mixed-race couples, a 
woman said that ‘when I was a teenager, I asked my granny to prey for me to 
find an English husband. But she refused it saying that they were gavur (non-
Muslim). Then I promised her that I would ask him to convert to Islam. Her 
preys were accepted (well, partly: he is Welsh, but then again I was lying 
about the conversion stuff, anyway)’. Because I could not hide my scepticism 
about such stories, a ‘house-husband’ –with a PhD in mathematics– asked 
me to remember the ‘usual funniness of manners in which people may decide 
to become a soldier or doctor when they grow up’. 
Educational Irrational as a Social/Cultural Capital 
Irrational may encapsulate individual and institutional realms together as 
exemplified in the case of education. Quite a few participants reported that 
they had decided to come to Britain for, in the words of one of them, ‘educated 
bull-shitting’. A hairdresser who is a distance learner in one of the fashion and 
design colleges in London said that ‘when I was in Turkey, I used to admire 
models educated in Europe. That’s why, I came here, but when I started to 
study, I realised that most of the girls like me went to schools which distributed 
certificates simply for money, rather than providing a proper education. Then I 
also figured out that the top models featuring talk shows on Turkish TVs had 
done the same… Who cares about the quality of education as long as you 
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have the etiquette from London or Paris...? What actually matters is torpil 
(Turkish for supporter): Who do you know and how well do they know you, if 
you know what I mean’. 
Irrationality is also related to different types of training/education programmes. 
Most respondents, for example , said that ‘when you go back home, people 
think that your English is perfect, no matter how good or bad it actually is’ A 
participant particularly commented that ‘even if your English is very 
competent, it is irrelevant to most of the jobs you may get anyway. I don’t 
know why companies prefer English speakers wh en it is not necessary’. 
During our conversations, it was acknowledged that although proficiency in 
English may not be useful for specific tasks at work, ‘employers prefer people 
with international experience’ since it helps raise employee profile. 
Nevertheless, ‘wasting so much money, time and effort to learn English 
abroad’ for the impression management of companies is deemed 
‘unjustifiable’ by participants. 
Some students also tend to think that the ‘stuff’ they do in master classes 
does not give a sense of specialisation, especially in social sciences. They 
hardly believe that they will be able to offer their future employers some skills 
that they obtain through master programmes. Nor do they, however, expect 
those employers to ask for ‘a great deal of skills mastered in courses’. A 
master student said that ‘our teachers in Turkey can offer programs for 
specific skill requirements’. Such participants occasionally accused the ruling 
parties of cronyism for ‘rewarding their men’s children with education in the 
West’. Pertinently,  this view also resonates the reservations of Higher 
Education Council about funding international master education (MEB, 2010), 
although one might see some potentials in sending students abroad. 
Economic Irrational 
In the world of migrant workers, the irrational may well be interwoven with 
economic rational. Using a conventional wisdom, for example, banks charge 
remittance fees to their best (Datta et al., 2007), but this in effect means the 
loss of potential profits: A worker said that ‘banks get thirty quid for five 
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hundred pounds. That’s why we usually send our monies with friends or 
relatives’. 
Irrational behaviours of economic institutions have more tangible impacts on 
migrant workers, especially at recessionary times since they may trigger, for 
example, a forced return: Indeed, a Kurdish woman selling tinsel articles came 
to the brink of deportation. She said that ‘all stores are closing in this shopping 
centre one by one because of the recession. The arcade management 
refuses a temporary reduction on rents. A little bit flexibility would benefit the 
shopping centre as well as individual shop owners. I could also avoid 
bankruptcy and deportation’.  
Irrational sometimes becomes an economically rational response of 
individuals to coercive structures. Some shop owners, for instance, said that 
‘we show artificially higher profits on the book to pay more tax, although we 
are at the brink of bankruptcy’. Yusuf lent his story to solve this puzzle: ‘I 
started to run an off-licence four years ago, but two months later a Tesco-
Express came to the street. And then it got licence to remain open till late. It 
can sell a lot cheaper with no middle-men for imports. I lost most of my 
customers during the recession. But I have to apply for visa extension: I will 
pretend that business is doing very well to avoid deportation’. 
When deportation actually looms over, the rational may give the way to 
desperate measures. As the budget for free legal aid has been tightened in 
recent years, for example, private legal services have expanded substantially 
(KeyNote, 2009). Several members of the community are using private law 
firms to avoid deportation, but these firms are often so expensive that some of 
them are even based in the City. In response to the paradox of the poorest 
using the most expensive law firms, a solicitor said that ‘desperate people go 
under huge debts to pay lawyers, especially if the case is hopeless’. 
The very presence of economic migrants in the UK is sometimes resulted 
from what one might call ‘organised irrational’. During the last decade, there 
were increases in the number of betting shops, especially in poorer areas led 
by oligopolistic companies such as Ladbroke and William Hill (KeyNote, 
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2010). Traditional café houses which are exclusively for men also provide 
informal gambling avenues for the community members. Players occasionally 
gamble over what is left after loosing for a while. However, the individual who 
wagers his life savings on a roll of the dice and wins is at most twice as happy 
as before; should he lose, he is psychologically destroyed (Sallaz, 2008). Kept 
out of a male dominated industry of gambling, some wives complained that 
‘we were ready to go back home after saving for years, but the husband has 
lost everything at gambling’. 
Economic rationale of being in the UK may also turn to something irrational 
because of intrinsic ambiguities in ‘self’ and ‘self-interest’: after a long pause 
to choose the right words, one of many unpaid woman workers (Erel and 
Tomlinson, 2005) sighed that ‘my husband may leave me with nothing if we  
get a divorce, but he would have to look after the kids’. When I said ‘children 
are not you’, her reply was ‘I am everything for them’. Blurred boundaries 
between ‘self’ and others may prolong the stay of migrant workers in the UK 
since the irrational and destructive antonyms are deeply rooted in ‘self-
interest’ (DuGay, 2005). Some migrant workers, for instance, send home 
remittances at their own expenses. To make savings, they work every day 
with only couple of hours of sleep by turn in shared rooms with several beds. 
A delivery man living in one of these kinds of places on top of a takeaway 
shop said that ‘I am going to get a marble grave for my father and then may 
be we can start a restaurant in Turkey… I don’t want to live here too long like 
my father… I should spend some time at home to enjoy myself before I die… 
But Allah knows may be the council will sort me in a crematory if I work even 
longer to please everybody in the family.’ 
Becoming British is a ‘tough-craft’ 
Politics of identity also has its own irrational components that influence 
people’s decisions on migration, survival strategies and return. A graduate 
said that ‘I came to this country for white wash… I have the chance to claim to 
top of the food chain. My children can become white Welsh or English even if I 
am married to a Turk’. Such a perception has historical roots across Turkey-
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originated migrant workers around the World, although not all community 
members consider themselves white: The British government, for example, 
introduced ‘other white’ into the 1972 census to cover migrant workers from 
Turkey, and they were officially recognised as ‘white’ by the 1986 racial pay 
discrimination act in Australia. 
Community members also play to racial irrationalities as a survival strategy in 
the UK. Restaurants, for example, improvise manoeuvres to reverse white 
reticence (Modood, 2011): a manager remarked that ’after nine/eleven, it took 
years to recover because of Islamphobia…customers penalised us for terrorist 
attacks. That’s why we started to sell alcohol’. The owner of another 
restaurant said that ‘since the beginning of the recession, only the rich eat out, 
but most of them want nothing more exotic than continental food. Although our 
chief makes the best kebab in Britain (she referred to a recent survey result by 
the Times), they hardly come here because of our Ottoman style decoration. 
We have to dress up the shop with a European outlook to survive’. Indeed, the 
turnover of a third restaurant posing as Italian ‘didn’t fall so badly during the 
recession’, and another restaurant advertising ‘Genuine English Cosine’ 
managed to get away ‘with a few scratches’. 
Rejecting non-white neighbours with a –gendered– racism, some community 
members prefer ‘clean districts’, a crypto for white neighbourhoods: women 
were ‘essentially indifferent’, for example, about black neighbours, but several 
men blatantly stereotyped black men for ‘failing to take up family 
responsibilities’ along with some anecdotes of ‘street-fights against them’. In 
the case of Arab neighbours, on the other hand, many men displayed 
‘conspiratorial irrational’ (Locke, 2006) condemning the historical war of Arabs 
for independence from the Ottoman as an ‘act of betrayal’.  Even so, they 
boast having ‘sympathy toward Arabs as internationally suppressed Muslim 
brothers.’ Against this, some women, especially the ones who tended to 
define themselves as ‘laik’ (secular) had no qualm in caricaturing Arab men as 
‘sexist and oppressive influence on women hiding behind twisted 
interpretations of Quran’. 
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Consequently, the racist rejection of non-white communities counter-couples 
‘a pride-bruising exclusion’ of themselves by the white British, paving the way 
for a sense of isolation. Most community members respond to this by creating 
‘replica-home-islands’ at smaller scales in the UK: they are tapped into a 
transnational existence through cyber networks. Social gatherings are also 
dominated by celebrity gossips, TV series and premier league news from 
home. Thus, staying in the UK ‘to become British’ is hollowed down to a 
presumedly ‘temporary period of hunting universal privileges’. A housewife 
said that ‘I look forward to returning home after getting the red (British 
passport) as an insurance policy for the kids’. The final word, however, usually 
belongs to coffee-fortune in telling whether or not somebody will bankrupt 
and/or ‘end up with the shame of failure back at home’.  
Conclusions 
This paper explored motivations behind migration in the case of a migrant 
workers’ community from Turkey, and thereby sought to rectify the lack of 
systematic research in this area. Our findings suggest that migration is much 
influenced by economic dynamics. It had been historically propelled by 
Turkey’s poverty (Blackburn and Mann, 1979; Castles and Miller, 1993), but 
economic growth in recent decades has also given a further momentum 
(Cam, 2007; Harris, 1995; Luttwak, 1998). 
Even so, motivations beyond economic factors can no longer be reduced to 
‘incidents’ as opposed to the ‘rate’ of migration (Mitchell 1959). Indeed, it is 
becoming increasingly more difficult to see migration simply as a matter of 
making money abroad (Bach, 2007; Barak, 2007; Cohen, 1988; Gray and 
Johnson, 2008; Massey and Espinoza, 1997; McGovern, 2007). As a product 
of economic growth in Turkey, for example, middle classes have also joined 
migration convoys with motivations beyond economic determinants. They 
may work abroad but they do not necessarily send remittances to home. On 
the contrary, they receive financial support from Turkey. They migrate to 
obtain social/cultural capital or to identify themselves within new spatial and 
 21 
social environments (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009). Above all, Kurds’ war for 
independence is a non-economic push factor for asylum seekers, 
substantiating the UN’s concerns further over global displacements (Hayter, 
2004). 
Studies on both economic and non-economic motivations have overlooked 
the importance of irrational. The role of irrational has been underlined in 
various areas including economics (Bone, 2006; Garot, 2009; Luttwak, 1999; 
Marx, 1971) and politics (Nassehi, 2005; Weber, 1947) as well as culture 
(Jackson and Scott 1997; Willis, 2010). It is, however, neglected in terms of 
migration, although the experience of migration may compel people to use 
their potentials to a maximum capacity. This includes the utilisation of 
‘irrational’ responses to ‘rational’ situations as well as the way around. Thus, 
migration provides yet another social setting for the rationalisation of irrational 
by structures (Weber, 1947). Even so, sometimes irrational simply mirrors an 
exaggerated notion of ‘reflexive workers’ (Atkinson, 2010). Such multi-faceted 
appearances in general point to the ubiquitous nature of irrational. 
Certain issues highlighted in this paper have policy implications .  Migrant 
workers’ skills , for example, are wasted due to over qualification. Potential tax 
revenues are also lost since people send their remittances to home through 
personal channels to avoid punitively expensive transaction fees in the 
loophole of under regulated financial services. The same applies to inflexible 
visa and work permit procedures for pushing migrant workers to a semi-
compliant (Ruhs and Anderson, 2006) or illegal status (Anderson, 2011). 
Further, preventative measures to limit gambling should be considered as it 
curbs potential returns and reinvestments. Finally, addressing the deficiencies 
in free legal aid provisions would not only mitigate against the exploitation of 
vulnerable people by unscrupulous law firms but also the loss of public 
resources for the  clog of appeal hearings.  
There should be further explorations into motivations as a dynamic process. It 
is important to understand the limits of original migration motivations in 
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explaining a migrant worker’s presence in the host society: the reasons for 
deciding to migrate in the first place may become overridden by different 
reasons for remaining or returning home. Accordingly, temporality and, 
hence, continual investigations are essential for a fuller insight into migration. 
To advance better-fitting sociological models for migration, however, there is 
also a need for the recognition of irrational as a ubiquitous counterpart of 
rational behaviours by individuals and structures. 
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